Blog | TSG Technology Consulting

Small carrier, same threat: OT security when your security team is three people

Written by TSG | Nov 18, 2026, 5:07:57 PM

At 2:17 on a Tuesday morning, an engineer at a regional carrier gets a call from the network operations center. A remote access account is behaving strangely. Traffic is still moving, and customers have not noticed anything. But the account can reach systems that help manage the network, and no one is sure how far it can go.

The carrier has three people focused on security. One is also responsible for compliance. Another helps maintain firewalls and routers. The third is on vacation.

That small team may be responsible for protecting a large and complex operation: offices, network sites, towers, routers, power systems, environmental controls, management platforms, and the connections that tie them together. The challenge is not to copy a national carrier’s security program with fewer people. It is to decide which risks could cause the most harm and make steady progress against them.

 

A small team still protects a big footprint

A carrier’s operational environment can stretch across a wide geography. In NTCA’s 2022 broadband survey, the average service area of responding rural providers was roughly 2,080 square miles. Inside that territory sit central offices, huts, towers, power systems, environmental controls, transport equipment, routers, and network management platforms.

Some of these systems fit the traditional definition of operational technology (OT), particularly equipment that monitors or controls physical processes such as power, cooling, and access. Others are better described as network infrastructure or IT.

The labels can be less important than each system’s role. A server running familiar software, for example, may still support a facility or network operation that customers depend on.

These systems also connect to one another. Remote access tools, management platforms, and vendor connections can link business networks with equipment at network sites. CISA identifies insecure remote access and insufficient separation between IT and OT networks as ways attackers may gain access or move between systems.

From a customer’s perspective, the concern is practical: could an intrusion disrupt service, expose sensitive information, or make recovery harder? An attacker may not need to take down the entire network to cause harm. A compromised management account, exposed remote access path, or poorly protected network device could provide a foothold and create further risk. Emergency calls may fail, businesses may lose connectivity, and a rural community may have few alternatives.

Executives do not need to become network engineers to oversee this risk. They do need a clear picture of which services matter most, what systems support them, what could interrupt them, and who has authority to respond.

 

Start with the service, then find the systems behind it

An asset inventory can sound like an administrative project. For a small carrier, it is a way to make limited effort count. In August 2025, CISA joined the NSA, FBI, and EPA, along with national cyber agencies from Australia, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, and New Zealand, to publish Foundations for OT Cybersecurity: Asset Inventory Guidance for Owners and Operators. The guidance treats an inventory as the starting point for a defensible architecture and lays out a phased process that begins by defining scope and objectives before anyone starts counting devices.

That ordering suits a small team. Start with a question the leadership team can answer: which services would cause the greatest harm if they were unavailable for an hour, a day, or longer? Work backward from those services to the systems and dependencies that support them. Include the obvious network equipment, but also management interfaces, backup power, cooling, remote access tools, authentication services, vendor connections, and configuration backups.

The first inventory does not need perfect detail. It needs to identify critical systems, their owners, how they connect, and which third parties can reach them. Given Verizon’s finding that nearly half of breaches now involve a third party, that last column deserves particular care. Mark anything unknown. An unknown connection is a useful finding, not a reason to delay.

Then group assets by operational importance. A device that supports emergency communications or controls access to network management deserves more attention than a low-consequence office system. That ranking gives a three-person team a defensible answer when everything appears urgent.

 

Make remote access deliberate

Remote access is essential when engineers and service providers need to troubleshoot equipment across a wide service area. It also creates a path an attacker may try to exploit.

The SANS Institute’s Five ICS Cybersecurity Critical Controls, developed by analyzing real attacks on industrial systems, name secure remote access and defensible architecture as two of the five highest-value controls for operational environments. Dragos, which co-developed the framework, continues to point to these controls as the most direct path to lowering operational risk. Their value for a small team is focus: they turn a long list of possible projects into a short list of proven ones.

In practice, review every route into network and facility systems. Remove accounts that are no longer needed. Require multifactor authentication for remote access, limit each account to the systems and tasks its user needs, and use a managed access path rather than exposing equipment directly to the internet. Where vendors need access, make it time-limited, attributable to a named user, and disabled when the work is done.

Separate operational networks from corporate systems wherever the design allows. Segmentation does not mean building an elaborate architecture overnight. It means deciding which systems should communicate, allowing only the necessary connections, and making it harder for an incident in one area to spread into another. CISA lists securing OT remote access and segmenting IT and OT networks among its primary mitigations, and the SANS framework places segmentation at the heart of a defensible architecture.

Small, reviewable changes often matter more than a large redesign that never gets funded. Begin with internet-facing management interfaces, shared administrator accounts, dormant vendor access, and paths that connect business networks to critical equipment.

 

Patch with the network in mind

“Patch everything immediately” is not a safe or realistic instruction for systems that keep customers connected. Some network and facility equipment may require vendor testing, maintenance windows, or a rollback plan. That does not make patching optional. It makes prioritization essential.

The data supports a targeted approach. Verizon’s 2025 DBIR found that organizations fully fixed only about half of the edge device vulnerabilities it tracked, with a median of 32 days to patch, while attackers often moved on those flaws almost as soon as they were published.

Keep a short list of critical and externally reachable devices, their software versions, vendor support status, and the person responsible for updates. Prioritize vulnerabilities that are known to be exploited, affect a system reachable from the internet, or could open a path to other important systems.

For equipment that cannot be patched promptly, record the reason, reduce exposure through access restrictions or network separation, monitor it more closely, and set a review date. CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog can help teams identify flaws that attackers are known to be using. The executive review can stay focused: Which unresolved exposure matters most? What is being done to reduce the risk? When will the team revisit it?

 

Rehearse the response before the call

Preparation has a measurable payoff. IBM’s 2026 Cost of a Data Breach Report put the average U.S. breach at $11.5 million, more than double the global average of $4.99 million. IBM’s 2025 report found that breaches an organization caught itself cost markedly less than those disclosed by the attacker, and it ranked tested incident response plans, clear roles, and crisis simulations among the habits that keep costs down.

A response plan is most useful when it fits the real operating model. A small carrier does not need a binder no one can use at 2 a.m. It needs clear decisions and contact paths that still work when normal systems are unavailable. The SANS framework makes this its first control for a reason: in operational environments, response must account for physical and service consequences, not just data.

Agree in advance on who can isolate a device, disable a remote account, contact a vendor, notify leadership, and coordinate with public authorities. Record out-of-band contact information. Define how engineers will preserve evidence while protecting service. Identify which actions require an operations lead’s approval because a security measure could interrupt customer connectivity.

Recovery deserves equal attention as prevention. Keep protected copies of network configurations, software images, and essential operating records. Know how to restore them without relying on potentially compromised accounts. Where equipment supports safe manual operation or a backup mode, document the procedure and practice it with the people expected to use it. CISA specifically recommends maintaining the ability to operate OT systems manually and routinely testing backup and continuity measures.

A short tabletop exercise can expose practical gaps. Give the team a scenario: a vendor account is compromised, a management device is behaving unexpectedly, or a facility system has lost visibility. Ask what happens in the first hour, who makes each decision, and how the carrier will maintain or restore service.

 

Buy capacity where it changes the outcome

Three people cannot provide round-the-clock monitoring, deep expertise in every system, and incident response on their own. That is not a challenge unique to small carriers. ISC2’s 2025 Cybersecurity Workforce Study, which surveyed more than 16,000 professionals, found that 95% reported at least one skills gap on their teams and 59% described their gaps as critical or significant. ISC2 even stopped publishing a headline workforce-gap number, concluding that missing skills now matter more than missing headcount. Leadership should plan for that constraint instead of treating it as a performance problem.

Managed detection, incident response retainers, trusted network integrators, and equipment vendors can extend the team’s reach. So can peer networks. NTCA runs CyberShare, an information sharing and analysis center built for small broadband providers, and CISA offers no-cost assessments and services that NTCA leadership has urged rural members to use. These options are often cheaper than a single new hire and bring pattern recognition no three-person team can build alone.

But outsourcing a task does not outsource accountability. With third parties now involved in nearly half of breaches, according to Verizon, the carrier still needs to know what each provider monitors, how quickly it will respond, what access it has, and who owns the next decision.

NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework is designed to help organizations of different sizes understand and prioritize cybersecurity outcomes in line with their mission and resources, and NTCA has published sector-specific guidance on applying it to small network providers. It can give leadership and technical staff a shared structure for discussing risk without turning the conversation into a checklist of tools.

 

Resilience begins with choosing what matters most

When the security team is three people, the goal is not to do everything at once. It is to reduce the risks most likely to interrupt essential service, expose customers, or delay recovery.

That begins with knowing which systems support critical services. It continues with controlled remote access, sensible network separation, risk-based patching, a practical response plan, and tested recovery procedures. Each step helps the team make better use of limited time and makes it easier for leaders to see where additional support is needed.

For carriers with OT in scope, TSG/ControlBurn can help identify attack paths to critical systems and prioritize remediation. It uses a digital twin to simulate paths through an OT environment without testing against production, then helps teams turn findings into a remediation plan.

The 2:17 a.m. call may still come. A small team can be better prepared to answer it with a current map, a clear escalation path, and an agreed first move. That is security organized around the service people count on.